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Abstract—In this paper, we present a novel vision of large 
scale of empirical password sets available and improve the 
understanding of passwords by revealing their interconnections 
and considering the security on a level of the whole password set 
instead of one single password level. Through the visualization of 
Yahoo, Phpbb, 12306, etc. we, for the first time, show what the 
spatial structure of empirical password sets are like and take the 
community and clustering patterns of the passwords into account 
to shed lights on the definition of popularity of a password based 
on their frequency and degree separately. Furthermore, we 
propose a model of statistical guessing attack from the 
perspective of the data’s topological space, which provide an 
explanation of the “cracking curve”. We also give a lower bound 
of the minimum size of the dictionary needed to compromise 
arbitrary ratio of any given password set by proving that it is 
equivalent to the minimum dominating set problem, which is a 
NP-complete problem. Hence the minimal dictionary problem is 
also NP-complete. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION  
This Text password has been a ubiquitous way to access 
resources and services since 1960 and the attempts of password 
cracking have never stopped ever since. Especially in recent 
years, the leakage and compromise of large scale of password 
sets repeatedly remind us of the urgency of the security of 
password sets enhancement. Different password cracking 
metrics have been adopted in prior works and dictionary based 
password cracking still remain to be the most ubiquitous way 
in numerous attacks nowadays.  
Conventional dictionary based password cracking metrics, 
such as the statistical guessing attack, usually start with a 
preprocessed dictionary and might involve some modification 
during the guessing process. Related research has been made 
by MSRA [1]. While due to the variance of original data set 
and dictionary size, the performance differs from one to the 
other. Bonneau made the first comparison in [2]. Nevertheless, 
dictionary based cracking metrics were proved effective and 
feasible in practice.  
According to Bonneau, dictionary based cracking metrics 
was first proposed by Morris and Thompson in their seminal 
1979 analysis of 3,000 passwords [3], and the two approaches, 
password cracking and semantic evaluation, was widely used 
ever since, even after Markov and PCFG were introduced. 
Though dictionary based cracking metrics have distinguished 
itself with feasible performance in practice and play a role of 
benchmark of the performance of a cracking technics, the 
reason why it works well remains UNKNOWN. Even though a 
lot of work have been made on password creation policy and 
password strength meters, the gap between our understanding 
of the security of one single password and the security of a 
whole password set was rarely discussed.  
To prevent a password from being compromised, prior 
work have focused on improving the strength of a single 
password and block out passwords whose frequency exceed a 
particular threshold, which is intuitively reasonable but far 
from perfect.  
For the former approach of assuring security, the first 
question is the definition of strong password, i.e. how to 
measure the security of a password and how to decide whether 
a password is strong or weak. Bonneau made a survey of the 
literature and propose the concept of Guessing Entropy, α-
guess-work [3]. Common practice is the requirement of the 
length and the variety of characters in a password, such as at 
least 8 characters, have at least one lower case character, have 
at least one capital letter, have at least one number, etc.  
For the latter approach of maintaining a blacklist of 
common passwords, it seems to be a game of cat and mouse. 
For every password that is blocked, the user almost always 
make a way out by performing a minor modification on it, for 
instance, by adding some characters at the rear, changing one 
or two digits, switch the first character into upper case, or 
simply use some other weak password that is not included in 
the list. The minor modification not only make the blacklist 
useless, but also leave a potential threat to the whole system. 
For the same blacklist, if everyone makes his or her own minor 
modification based on some limited popular passwords, the 
results could be different but similar. For example, if we all 
submit “password” as our password and it was blocked, the 
possible choices after minor modification might be 
“password1”, “password12”, “password123”, “p@assword”, 
“Password”, etc. As we will discuss in this paper, the leakage 
of one single vulnerable password could lead the compromise 
of password one after another, thus creating a link reaction and 
endanger a larger scale of accounts.  
Our first contribution is the visualization of several 
empirical password sets including Yahoo!, phpbb, myspace, 
honeynet, hotmail, 12306, and build a network based on the 
inter connection of the passwords. To our knowledge, this is 
the first visualization of large scale password sets in the form 
of networks.  
The second contribution is the exploration of the spatial 
structure of empirical data of passwords and prove that the 
distribution of passwords is a scale-free network, which 
provide an explanation of the attacking curve that has long 
been observed in decades.  
Our final contribution is the model of statistical guessing 
attack, which explain the “cracking curve” that has been 
observed in variety of cracking results. Based on the model, we 
also have a discussion on the popularity of passwords from the 
perspective of frequency and degree separately. At last, we 
focus on the optimal cracking problem which aims at cracking 
a password set with the minimal size dictionary needed. We 
prove that the optimal cracking problem is equal to one of the 
24 classic NP-complete problems, the dominating set problem, 
and thus it is also a NP-complete problem. 
II.   BACKGROUND 
A.    The definition of distance between passwords 
Since we are going to figure out the relations of passwords, 
the first thing we need to do is to define the relationship 
between two passwords. When we are going to do something, 
we estimate the Pros and Cons. Similarly, when we are going 
to know something, we list the similarity and difference. 
Hence, what is the difference of two passwords? How to 
measure the degree of similarity and difference? Passwords are 
strings of alphabets, numbers and special characters, so the first 
choice is how we measure the similarity and difference of two 
strings ------ the edit distance. 
Passwords are strings of alphabets, numbers, and special 
characters. In this paper, we adopt edit distance for the 
measurement of passwords.  
Edit distance is a way of quantifying how dissimilar two 
strings (e.g., words) are to one another by counting the 
minimum number of operations required to transform one 
string into the other. One of the simplest sets of edit operations 
is that defined by Levenshtein in 1966 [4].  
Several definitions of edit distance were defined by using 
different sets of unit string operations. In this paper we use one 
of the most common and widely used variants called 
Levenshtein distance, which was named after Vladimir 
Levenshtein [5]. Levenshtein distance may also simply be 
referred to as "edit distance", although several variants exist 
[6]. 
B.   Computation and the Algorithm 
Using Levenshtein's original operations, the edit distance 
was defined by the recurrence. 
In 1964, Damerau published the first recursive version of 
algorithm which takes exponential time for computing the edit 
distance between two strings [7]. And it is commonly credited 
to Wagner and Fischer who proposed an improved version of 
dynamic programming algorithm that has both the time and 
space complexity of O(mn) [8]. 
III.   VISUALIZATION OF THE EMPIRICAL PASSWORD SETS 
A.   prior method of analysing a password set 
•   Statistical Analyze 
In most of the case, the presentation of the passwords is 
a list of the statistical information of the passwords, like 
the frequency, i.e. the number of the passwords that is 
identical to itself. Some of them might include the user 
name, the email, the age, gender, the register time, and 
even credit card information. This is nothing but a list 
of the account information. 
•   Word cloud of password set  
Word cloud is another option when visualizing words. 
According to the homepage introduction of Wordle, 
which is an online word cloud service provider (Certain 
parts of Wordle are © IBM Corporation, The text and 
design of the web site itself are Copyright © 2008 
Jonathan Feinberg, and all rights are reserved.), the 
word clouds generated from given text give greater 
prominence to words that have higher frequency in the 
source text. Note that the fonts, layouts and color 
schemes can be tweaked by the users.  
In [9], Wordle was set up to show features in the 
password set of Rockyou, such as the mixed numeric 
and text dates. 
 
Figure 1 
 
This method gives more straightforward and obvious 
information about the password set than the statistical 
table. Through the difference in size, the more 
important password distinguishes themselves from the 
ones that weights less. The variance in color also make 
the whole set more friendly than a simple dumb list of 
numbers. Furthermore, some patterns and features draw 
the attention of viewers. Sequences like “123456”, 
“qwer”( which is part of the first line of a 
keyboard),”123”,”woaini”(which means “I love you” in 
Chinese) appear in many of the passwords. 
B.   Method of Our Visualization 
•   The procedure of building a graph of the given data set:  
1) each unique password is a single node in the graph;  
2) two nodes are linked if the distance between two 
corresponding passwords is less than D(i,j) ( in this 
case, we assume it as 3);  
3) repeat step 2 until every two passwords in the data 
set have been compared;  
4) reorganize the graph and output the result.  
In practice, we compute the distance between every two 
passwords and store in form of adjacent table. In order 
to save space, we do not consider the form of adjacent 
matrix, which is O(n^2) in space complexity (n is the 
number of the total passwords in the date set). 
•   1) The computing complexity analyze  
In order to analyze the computing complexity in 
password transformation, we need to make sure the 
basic components of passwords. For the characters used 
in passwords, we have the following chart: 
Type numbers 
Alphabet[a-zA-Z] 26 
Digit[0-9] 10 
Special Characters ? 
 
The table above is slightly different from Weir’s Listing 
of different string types in his paper: 1) the upper case 
of alphabet are taken into account; 2) Weir list 28 
special characters (! @#$%^&*()-_=+ [] {};’:”,. <>/? ) 
in the table, which is part of the special characters on 
the keyboard. While some of the characters (such as 
blank space ~`, and some other special characters on 
mobile keyboard) are absent in Weir’s list, we assume 
that Weir learn the result form the statistical work of 
empirical password set. It is worth noting that some 
special characters, like blank space, do exist in a large 
amount in some of our data set.  
In theory, every item in the 128 ASCII（American 
Standard Code for Information Interchange）characters 
or the set of bytes [0-255] can be used in passwords 
under specific password policy. Hence the definition of 
symbols in our following analyze are as follows:  
N: the number of different possible characters;  
L(p): the length of password p;  
D(pa,pb): the edit distance between password pa an pb; 
 Sp(k): the set of candidate passwords that has a 
distance k from password p, i.e. Sp(k) = { passwd | 
D(passwd,p)= k }.  
Intuitively, Sp(0)={p};  
# Sp(k): the number of passwords in set Sp(k);  
When k=0, 
 #Sp(0)=1;  
When k=1, i.e. the edit distance is 1.  
L(p)+1:  
Insertion: !" # $%% *'  
L(p):  
Substitution: !" #$ *('(1)  
L(p)-1:  
Deletion: !" #$   
Thus  
#Sp(1)=!"# $ +11 *(  + !" #$   +!" #$ *('(1)  
 = 2" # + 1 *'  
When k=2, i.e. the edit distance is 2.  
L(p)+2:  
Insertion twice: !" # $%% *'%   
L(p)+1:  
Substitution and insertion: !" #$ * &'1 *!" # )$$ *&  
L(p):  
Insertion and Deletion: !" #$ *!" #$ *&  
Substitution twice: !" #$ *('(1)$     
L(p)-1:  
Deletion and Substitution: !" #$ *!" # &$$ *((&1)  
L(p)-2:  
Deletion twice: !" #$   
Sum up all the situations and  
#Sp(2) = 
!" #" $ + !" # $ + 1 '"(# $ ⋅ '   
It can be proved that the number of passwords 
# Sp(k) = ! "# $ ⋅ &# !! 
Thus the practically important case is k=1,2, and 3 [10]. 
C.   Examples of Our Visualization 
In order to compare with previous practice of visualization 
method, we will also take the top 100 password of the 12306 
leakage as the example. The the adjacent table is taken as input 
for Gephi and the output is the graph of the network within the 
distance of 1, 2 and 3 separately. As shown in the picture, the 
visualization of 12306’s top 100 passwords is as follows: 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 is the graph of the top 100 passwords within edit 
distance 1 in 12306 and figure 3 and figure 4 is the graph 
within 2 and 3 separately. As we can see in the graph, the 
number of edges increase as the edit distance grows. The whole 
graph is a network of passwords with some isolated nodes.  
For brevity, we also only present the nodes that has a 
connection to others and show the password as their own label 
in figure 5 to make it more clear and straightforward. 
 
From the example of the top 100 passwords of the 12306, 
we expose the evolution of the password network within the 
distance k = 1, 2, and 3 and visualize the distribution of a 
empirical password set.  
To further analyze the distribution of the data, we take the 
community and clustering method to separate the network apart 
and give a more clear vision of the structure of the data set. 
Again, we take the top 100 12306 password set for the example 
in figure 6. 
Figure 5 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 6 
To our surprise, like the social network of human beings, 
passwords have their own “community” and “social network”. 
To make our observation convincing and solid, we further 
visualize other data set available. 
 
Figure 7 
Figure 7 the graph of the full 12306 password data after 
clustering. For the sake of clarity, we filter the isolated nodes in 
the graph and present the reorganized graph including the 
nodes that have at least one connection with others in figure 8. 
It is obvious that the isolated nodes is a single community 
when analyzing and there is no much point of those single 
“island”. 
 
Figure 8 
 
Figure 9 
Figure 9 is the graph of the Yahoo! data set. To better 
display the community distribution, we filter the communities 
whose size is less than 0.1% and the graph is shown in figure 
10. 
 
Figure 10 
As shown in the graph above, the distribution of passwords 
tends to form communities and clusters. To put it another way, 
some passwords are closer to other passwords and the whole 
data set is split into different parts.  
After visualizing the data sets mentioned above, we further 
explore the data. Since the data set form a network and the 
focus is the interconnection of nodes, the degree of nodes, 
which is the number of nodes that is connected to the node, 
represent more information. The Yahoo data is taken as an 
example and the degree-rank curve is shown in figure 11. 
 
1)   Scale-free network of empirical password sets  
Figure 11 From figure 11, the degree distribution of the 
Yahoo data follows a power law, i.e.  
	   ! " ~"^(&')!! 
So the topological distribution of the password sets is a 
scale-free network [11]. Results of other data sets show similar 
conclusion. Until now, we have build a network of the data set 
and prove it to be a scale free network. The result match with 
our common sense that popular password is widely used and a 
great number of users tend to use at least similar password.  
In conclusion, the security of one single account and the 
whole system are not isolated. As the stars in the sky, though 
they seems to be distributed randomly, through the estimation 
of their distance (actually the gravity between each other), the 
ancient human beings divided them into different galaxy and 
made beautiful stories. In this paper, we might do exactly the 
same thing and shed light on the “social” network of 
passwords. From previous research work, we already realize 
that individuals tend to choose same passwords. Then in this 
paper, we reveal the fact that people tend to choose similar 
passwords in a much more higher chance. If we think about it 
carefully, it does make sense. Since we are individuals and we 
choose our passwords independently, if we tend to choose 
same passwords, then the odds of we choose password that is 
slightly different from each other is much higher. That is where 
the network of our password begin.  
The study of networks originates in the ancient Graph 
theory and becoming more and more important in both 
theoretical research and empirical applications. The electric 
power grid, the WWW, and the pattern of air traffic between 
airports are early examples of networks in real life. The boom 
of Social Network in the last decades have made a big step 
forward in the understanding of social science. The networks of 
movie actors, scientific collaboration.  
Unlike the components like people, airports, routers on the 
Internet that consist of networks, password is chosen 
independently and is supposed to be personal and private. We 
make friends with others and our friends has friends of their 
own, so the social network is generated. The planes fly 
between airports and vehicles go along the roads between 
cities, so we have the traffic and transportation network in 
geology. The routers on the internet deliver packages between 
websites and user clients, so we have the so-called Internet. 
Networks are everywhere. As far as we are concerned, the 
networks that has been studied so far are PUBIC in some 
degree. The purpose of the network is to share or transport 
something, like information, grocery and even virus. As the 
key to access resources or accounts, password is supposed to 
be private in the first place. Unfortunately, it turns out that the 
passwords generate a network that we have never imagine and 
expose inevitable threaten for numerous accounts and 
organizations. 
2)   Frequency Vs. Degree  
 When we only see the discrete list of passwords, frequency 
is the only factor we could consider to estimate the popularity 
of a password. Now that we have the network of the whole 
password set, the concept of Degree Centrality is to be 
introduced for a better understanding of the password itself.  
In Graph Theory, the degree of a node in a graph is the number 
of edges incident to the node, with loops counted twice [12].  
 
 
Figure 12  
 
Figure 13  
 Figure 12 is curve of frequency and figure 13 the degree 
distribution in the descending order of frequency. As show in 
figure 13, there is no positive relevance between the degree and 
the frequency of a password. In other words, higher frequency 
does not mean greater popularity in the password set [1].  
 Compared to the Frequency of passwords, in the network of 
password set, we believe that the node (i.e. the password it 
represents) with higher degree has more power or impact on 
the whole password set. According to the definition of degree 
of a node, a node with higher degree covers more nodes than 
the other nodes, including the nodes with higher frequency. In 
a brute-force statistical guessing attacking, this mean the 
dictionary based on passwords in the decreasing order of 
degree could compromise more accounts than the dictionary 
based on passwords in the decreasing order of frequency.  
 In order to prove the validation and solidness of our 
inference, we dig deeper into the graph we have built. 
IV.   THE STATISTICAL GUESSING MODEL 
Assume we have two dictionaries with same number of 
passwords n:  
One is the dictionary Dic-1 based on passwords in the 
decreasing order of frequency, which including password !""   ,!"#$   ,!"#$   ,!"#$   ,!"#$   ……, "#(%&#)  ,!"#$   .  At the same 
time, the frequency of the password !"#   is denoted as ! "#$   
and ! "## $  >! "#$ %  > !" #$% !  > !" #$% !  > !" #$% !  >
……>!" #$(&'$) !  >!" #$% !  
 
The other dictionary Dic-2 based on passwords in the 
decreasing order of degree, which including password !"#   ,!"##   ,!"#$   ,!"#$   ,!"#$   ……, "#(%&')  ,!"#$   . At the same 
time, the degree of the password  !"#   is denoted as ! "#$   
and  
 ! "#$   > ! "##   > ! "#$   > ! "#$   > ! "#$   > 
…… > ! "#(%&')   > ! "#$   
 
Then we perform a simulation a brute-force statistical 
guessing attack based on Dic-1 and Dic-2 separately. Since we 
we have built a whole graph of the targeted password set, it 
provide a perfect method to estimate the maximum success 
ratio.  
To estimate the number of potential maximum successful 
guesses, the concept of neighborhood is introduced.  
In Graph Theory, the neighborhood of a vertex v in a graph 
G(V,E) is the sets of adjacent vertices of G consisting of all 
vertices adjacent to v.  
The neighborhood is often denoted !" #   or (when the 
graph is unambiguous) N(v). Note that the concept of 
neighborhood we discuss in this paper is the closed 
neighborhood, in which v itself is included. There is another 
version of neighborhood is called open neighborhood when v 
itself is not included [13].  
The concept of neighborhood of one vertex can be naturally 
extended to a set of vertices S, which is the union of all the 
neighborhoods of the vertices in set S, i.e. the set of all vertices 
in the original graph which is adjacent to at least one member 
of S.  
Denoted as ! "   and we have  ! "   =  ! "##%#&'   , 
in which #S is the number of vertices in S and is the i-th 
vertex in S.  
Then for two attackers with dictionary Dic-1 and Dic-2 
separately, the maximum number of vertices they could cover 
is  ! "#$%#&   = ! "#$%$&'    ,in which i=1 or 2.  
Thus their corresponding maximum successful guesses are  !"#$ %&'(&)   = ! "#$%∈' ()*+),   . 
To make a further comparison between the difference of 
frequency and degree, we compute the  !"#$ %&'(1*   and  !"#$ %&'(2    of dictionary Dic-1 and Dic-2 whose size 
range from 1 to the size of the original password set. We take 
the data set of Yahoo as example and the result is presented in 
figure 14.  
 
Figure 14  
The successful guesses curve also support the effectiveness 
of statistical guessing based on the dictionary of frequency. 
The diminishing return, which has also been observed in [2], of 
dictionary based attacking can also be observed in both of the 
two curve.  
While contrary to our prediction, the dictionary ranked in 
frequency is more efficient in cracking yahoo, for which we 
believe is the unbalanced proportion of frequency and degree.  
The upper bound of the success ratio using the dictionary 
Dic-1 and Dic-2 separately is the result of reorganizing the 
dictionary order to combine the frequency of the node and its 
neighbor. Of course the attacker can start a new round by 
searching the closure of the password that has been 
compromised.  
1)   The optimal cracking problem  
In conventional password cracking, the size of dictionary 
has a significant impact on the success rate of the cracking. In 
order to achieve higher success rate, most researchers tend to 
use dictionary as large as possible. The reason is 
straightforward-----the larger dictionary means the higher 
possibility of covering more passwords in the targeted set. But 
due to the efficiency of time and space, all results see 
diminishing return as the dictionary size grows [14]. The 
success guessing curves have been observed in almost every 
previous attempts to crack as more accounts as possible.  
Daniel V. Klein [15] made the first attempt to identify the 
higher efficient sub-dictionary. J Bonneau define a success rate 
α when introducing α-guesswork to evaluate the number of 
guesses of an attacker. And Diogo Mónica, Carlos Ribeiro [16] 
discussed the compression ratio in a implementation of 
SOM(Self-Organizing Maps) which preserve the topological 
position passwords.  
Since we have built a graph of the password set, the sub-
dictionary searching work become easier. Our goal is to find a 
subset of strings to cover as more passwords as possible. 
Considering we are dealing with this problem on a graph, if we 
rephrase the problem a little bit, the goal is to find a subset of 
nodes that has connections to all the other nodes. That is 
exactly the definition of Domainating Set in Graph Theory:  
Definition: Given a graph G = (V, E) with V = {1, 2, ..., n}, 
a dominating set for a graph G is a subset D of V such that 
every vertex not in D is adjacent to at least one member of D. 
The domination number γ(G) is the number of vertices in a 
smallest dominating set for G. (a detailed version definition 
and reference material can be found in [17]).  
Hence the minimum size of the dictionary to cover the 
targeted password set, i.e. its lower bound, equals γ(G). For any 
password set S={p1,p2,p3,…..pn}, we can construct a graph 
G=(V,E) through the steps in section 2, then we have 
transformation f and g: ! →# $   :for each password in S, add a corresponding 
vertex in graph G; for every two of the password in S, a edge is 
attached between them in G.  
! →# $  :  traversal of the graph G and the full set of S is 
obtained.  
The complexity of transformation g is linear to n while 
transformation f has the extra cost of computing the edges, 
which is 2" = $ $%&'   . Both are polynomial-time. It is 
legitimate to conclude a exactly one-to-one correspondence 
between the password in S and the vertex in G. Those 
transformations show that a algorithm for the minimum 
dictionary size also provide an algorithm for the minimum 
dominating set and vice versa. In other words, this two issues 
are equivalent in terms of computing complexity.  
The minimum dominating set problem is a well-known NP-
hard problem, which is proved by Garey & Johnson in 1979 
[18] and Kann provide a pair of polynomial-time L-reductions 
between the minimum dominating set problem and the set 
cover problem, the decision version of set covering was one of 
Karp's 21 NP-complete problems, in 1992 [19].  
Moreover, the minimum domination set is a classic 
problem in Graph Theory and has been studied for years. For a 
vertex of degree k, it domains itself and k other vertices [20]. 
Every n-vertex graph with minimum degree k has a dominating 
set of size at most ! "#$% &#"&#"     ( Arnautov 1974 ,Payan 
1975). Exact bound remains to be explored when k is small and 
McCuaig-Shepherd 1989 and Reed 1996 gives a tighter bound 
for specified graph. Note that this conclusion also applies to 
other variants of dictionary based cracking metrics when the 
corresponding method of building the graph.  
V.   CONDLUSION 
In this paper, we produce more readable and nifty-looking 
presentation of empirical password sets in the form of 
networks. The spatial structure of the password sets is 
discussed for the first time and is proved to be a scale-free 
network whose degree follow a power law.  
Furthermore, we proposed a statistical guessing model that 
explain the diminishing return, also known as the cracking 
curve, that has been observed in nearly every statistical 
guessing attack. We also prove the equality of the minimal 
dictionary size problem and the dominating set problem in 
computing complexity, hence the optimal dictionary size 
problem is also NP-complete. 
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